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The Lure Crop Alternative1
Steven D. Fairaizl and William K. Pfeifer

Abstract.—Lure crops are proposed as an alternative to
scaring waterfowl. The lure crop works on the principle of
permitting waterfowl to feed undisturbed for the duration of
the damage season in an unharvested field of their choice
thereby utilizing trampled grain. Waterfowl from adjacent
areas are encouraged to use the lure crop through the use of
scaring devices placed in protected fields. General criteria for implementation of a lure cr.pp project and specific
criteria for lure crop purchases are presented. Factors
contributing to a successful lure crop and problems which
reduced lure crop effectiveness are identified. Benefit/
cost analysis of lure crops was completed.

INTRODUCTION

Depredations continued into the 1950's when
the problem was termed a limiting factor in waterfowl management (Munro and Gollop 1955). An antiduck sentiment began developing in the North
Dakota agricultural community and farmers threatened to take matters into their own hands. For
example, organizations such as the Souris Duck
Control Association were formed to deal with the
depredation problem. This organization advocated
compensatory legislation, duck sterilization,
population reductions and wetland drainage. In
an attempt to curb these threats, the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Services (FWS), in the 1950's, began
scaring ducks from unharvested small grain fields
(Hammond 1950)? Scaring produced limited results
in the early part of the damage season or during
severe damage seasons because alternative feeding
sites into which birds could be chased were minimal. Furthermore, scaring birds from field to
field caused inefficient food utilization and increased trampling damages.

The conflict between waterfowl and North
Dakota farmers was recognized around 1905 when
the prairies were plowed and seeded. The problem
escalated in 1936 when the marshes of Lower
Souris National Wildlife Refuge were restored.
By 1939 an estimated 200,000 ducks were present
on the refuge and severe depredations to shocked
grains occurred (Hammond 1961). Numerous isolated instances of depredations, such as these,
occurred in the early 1900's but not until the
mid-1940's did they generally become widespread.
The problem intensified during the war years because of an inadequate supply of ammunition, fewer people hunting less than in normal times, gas,
tire and auto rationing, shortage of farm help
during the harvest season, cultivation of increased acreages of marginal and submarginal
lands, and the rising prices of commodities (Day
1944).

Scaring was supplemented by feeding stations
established on refuges. The stations worked well
in reducing depredations as long as weather conditions allowed vehicle access to maintain a sufficient daily food supply. These two techniques
were extensively utilized until the early 1970's.

Literature reviews indicated waterfowl depredations to small grains were caused primarily
by one or more of the following factors: delayed
spring planting, reduced plant growth rate, or
wet fall weather conditions. The agricultural
practice of swathing grain, instead of straight
combining, increased the vulnerability of crops
to waterfowl damage.

Due to the limited effectiveness of these
projects, the agricultural community requested a
study of new approaches for resolution of the
problem. Consequently, a three-year lure crop
pilot study was established in 1975 to be tested
in Bottineau, Nelson and Ramsey Counties of North
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Dakota. In subsequent years the study was expanded to include the entire state and extended
until three years of usable data had been collected.

Stabilization and Conservation Service (ASCS)
appraised the selected field for yield and acreage.
The value of the crop was determined by the current inbound elevator price minus the shipping
charges. During the 1979 grain handlers' strike,
lure crop contracts were based on Minneapolis or
Duluth prices rather than the suppressed prices at
local elevators. The contract was then completed
and the area posted as a "LURE CROP". Adjacent
landowners were advised how to scare birds from
their unharvested fields into the lure crop.

The basic concept of the lure crop technique
was to purchase the crop in a field which had
been selected by the birds and where a feeding
pattern had been established, thereby allowing
birds to congregate and feed undisturbed. Waterfowl feeding in surrounding small grain fields
were induced into the lure crop and allowed to
feed until the damage potential passed. This
process increased feeding efficiency and reduced
trampling.

The lure crop was released when harvest operations in the surrounding area were 75-80 percent
complete and the weather conditions became favorable for resuming harvest. All lure crops were
released and scaring devices placed in the field
prior to the opening of waterfowl hunting season.
This procedure prevented a large kill on opening
day and allowed hunting by local sportsmen to
resolve, by scaring, any later complaints which
arose. Upon release of the field, observations
were made on the amount and condition of the remaining grain. If mechanically possible, the
landowner was required to harvest the lure crop.
Salvaged grain was sold at a local elevator, the
amount received deducted from the original contract price, and the difference paid to the farmer.
If the field was not harvestable, $5 per acre was
deducted from the contract price in lieu of normal
harvesting costs. Some salvaged grain was of feed
grade quality and was not accepted at the local
elevator. In these cases, FWS stored this grain
on a nearby National Wildlife Refuge for wildlife
feed and the farmer received the full contract
price.

In 1975 and 1978 the project was funded at
the $300,000 level. The 1976, 1977, 1979 and
1980 projects had an operational budget of
$125,000 to $150,000. From 1975 to 1978 complete
expenditures of annual funds did not occur for
the following reasons: (1) populations of mallards and pintails, the species which are responsible for most depredations, were low in some
counties during harvest; (2) heavy rains in
southern Canada delayed harvest and slowed migration into North Dakota; (3) refuge feeding programs kept ducks from entering fields outside the
refuge boundary; (4) warm, dry weather allowed
for an early harvest; (5) landowners were unwilling to sell a crop to FWS; and (6) an increase of
straight combining and grain dryers reduced the
length of time the grain was susceptible to waterfowl damage.
During 1979 and 1980 a combination of late
spring planting and fall rains produced severe
depredations which resulted in numerous opportunities for lure crop purchases and data collection.

In 1979 two harvested fields were rented and
baited. Grain was trucked into the field, spread
into windrows, and decoys added to attract ducks.
Under a special contract, the landowner received
a fee of between $250-$350, depending on field
size, for the use of his field. Baited fields
were released ten days prior to the opening of
hunting season in compliance with federal hunting
regulations.

METHODS
Lure Crop Purchase
Beginning in early August ground and aerial
surveys were conducted to monitor the build-up
in local waterfowl populations. Field observations were initiated after a concentration of
several hundred field-feeding ducks were located
or a complaint received. Data were gathered on
numbers and species of birds in the area, length
of time birds had been feeding in the field, distance birds were coming to feed, harvest and
weather conditions, and land ownership. After
contacting the landowner, the options of purchasing the grain as a lure crop field^ or providing
extension services for scaring the ducks were
discussed.

Evaluation Procedures
Characteristics of lure crop fields and daily
observations were recorded on two separate data
sheets. The lure crop data sheet was completed at
the time of purchase and daily observation forms
were completed each time the field was visited.
During 1979 and 1980, 30 lure crops were
selected for evaluation based on the following
criteria: (1) expected to hold a minimum of
2,000 ducks; (2) available for sampling before
more than two days damage occurred; (3) regular
shape and uniformity with respect to yield; and
(4) subject to daily observation without disturbing the feeding ducks.

Animal Damage Control (ADC) personnel had
the responsibility for purchasing and releasing
lure crop fields and personnel of the Agricultural

Upon release, lure crops purchased in 1979
were divided into damaged and undamaged strata
based on field observations. In fields where

For the purpose of this report, the term
"lure crop field" implies ownership of grain
only, not ownership of land.
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damage was 100 percent, no stratification was possible. Within each stratum, grain kernels from
20 six-inch-square samples were collected. In
1980, samples were also taken at the time of purchase and only ten samples were collected from
each stratum or from the total field. These samples were used to determine the extent of damage
caused by ducks feeding in a lure crop field.

purchase of 34 lure crops in 1979 and 21 in 1980.
Between 1976 and 1980, 16 barley, 24 spring wheat
and 20 durum crops were purchased (Table 2 ) . During 1979, two harvested fields were rented and
baited (Table 3 ) .
The 1979 and 1980 evaluation was designed to
measure the amount of damage caused by ducks feeding in a lure crop, quantify trampling damage,
and calculate a benefit/cost ratio. In the lure
crops used for this evaluation, damage caused by
feeding ducks ranged from 2-100 percent in barley
fields, 43-100 percent in wheat fields and 52-100
percent in durum fields. In 47 percent of evaluated fields grain damage was 100 percent because
ducks ate and trampled all available grain, making
harvest mechanically impossible. All of this damage was attributable to ducks because weather conditions cleared and adjacent fields were harvested.

RESULTS
Total costs of the North Dakota lure crop
pilot project incurred from 1975-1980 totaled
$289,493.95 (Table 1 ) . Relatively dry weather
conditions during the years 1975-1978 resulted in
the purchase of one lure crop in 1976 and six in
1978. Late spring planting and fall rain, however, resulted in severe depredations and the

Table 1. Summary of North Dakota Lure Crop
Expenditures from 1975 to 1980

No. of Lure Crops
Year
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
Totals
Averages

Purchased

Acres

0
1
0
6
34
21
62
10

0
35
0
180
1,,020
778
2,,013
336

Barley
Total
Average
Spring Wheat
Total
Average
Durum
Total
Average

0
*
0
*
$28,519..00
24,714..50
$53,233.,50
$8,872..25

0

Total
Expenditures

**$30,000.00

$30,000.00
5,502.50

**
**
0
0

0
19,157.52
119,061.21
115,772.72
$289,493.95
$48,248.99

Size
(Acres)

Summary of North Dakota Lure Crops Purchased
from 1975 to 1980
Yield
(Bu/Acre)

Net

Cost/Bu

Total
Payment

Reductions

Payment

$40.19
2.51

$56,020.18
3,501.26

$9,502.10
593.88

$46,518.08
2,907.38

16

576.0
36.0

688.9
43.1

24

629.37
26.22

836.42
34.85

92.00
3.83

87,519.40
3,646.64

5,111.97
213.00

82,407.43
3,433.64

20

572.8
28.6

682.8
34.1

89.19
4.46

80,127.62
4,006.38

8,392.68
419.63

71,734.94
3,586.75

Table 3.

County

0
$5,502.50

Evaluation
Costs

19,157.52
90,542.21
86,058.22
5,000.00
$35,000.00
$201,260.45
$5,833.33
$33,543.41
*Administrative costs of $8,100 in 1976 and $14,500 in 1978
were taken from operational Animal Damage Control funds.
**The 1975 $30,000 appropriation was spent between
September 1L975 and May 1977.

Table 2.

No. of
Fields

Administrative
Costs

Net Cost of
Lure Crops

Summary of 1979 North Dakota Baited Fields

Size
(Acres)

Cost

Grain Deposited
(Bu)

Benson

50

$250.00

400

Burke

185

350.00

80

Total

235

$600.00

480

Average

118

$300.00

240
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Based on a 60-day damage season and the observation that ducks generally are not allowed to
spend more than two days in a field before being
frightened, a depredating flock could damage 30
fields. Therefore, a minimum of 147 and a maximum of 1,860 complaints were resolved by the purchase of 60 lure crops and the rental of two baited fields. These data indicated that the purchase
of a lure crop stopped all waterfowl depredation
complaints in the surrounding area.

The damage factor used to quantify trampling
losses was defined as the total damage, which included trampling and eating, caused by ducks,
divided by the amount of grain eaten by ducks.
Thus the damage factor is D= T&E w here T=amount
of grain lost to harvest by trampling and E=
amount of grain eaten.
Studies conducted by Hammond (1961), Sugden
and Georzen (1979) and observations from the 1979
lure crop project were used to estimate damage
factors in the following example. Based on a consumption rate of 115g/bird/day (Sugden 1979), an
average 1979 lure crop yield of 35 bu/a and life
of 30 days, and the observation that birds were
scared from unharvested fields about every two
days (Duncan and Zahn, pers. comm.), the following conclusions were drawn: For field sizes of
10-50 acres and flock sizes of 100-10,000 birds,
damage factors would range from 2.5-3.15 for barley. In fields with 1,000 ducks, which is the
average number in a lure crop field at the time
of purchase, the damage factor would be 3. This
means that if a lure crop had not been purchased
in this area, the dollar value of damage to small
grain would have been three times as great as the
purchase cost.

Effective range of the lure crops extended
to a maximum of five miles based on daily observations of the distance birds traveled from the
roost to the field. However, the roost being
utilized by ducks was located less than one mile
from the field in 78 percent of the lure crops.
In several cases, ducks switched roosts to a wetland less than a mile from the lure crop field.
These observations indicated lure crops with adjacent wetlands were preferred. In one extreme
case, a Nelson county lure crop field attracted,
on a daily basis, a flock of ducks 16 miles from
Stump Lake. The fidelity of ducks for a selected
undisturbed feeding site was indicated by many
observations of ducks flying over several miles
of swathed grain fields to feed in a lure crop.

Data on the amount of total damage caused by
ducks were used to calculate the benefit/cost
ratio. Costs were defined as the amount of funds
expended on personnel, logistics, equipment, administration and field purchases. Benefits were
defined as the dollar value of total damage ducks
would have caused without a lure crop field. By
dividing the total losses due to depredations
(92,027.05) by the net cost of the fields plus
administrative costs ($137,654.38) and multiplying by a damage factor of 3, a benefit/cost ratio
of 2:1 was calculated for the North Dakota lure
crop pilot project.

The number of days a lure crop was utilized
by ducks ranged from 0-48. Fields with zero days
usage resulted from preselection, by ADC personnel,
of a lure crop field. Ducks appear to have their
own criteria for feeding site selection and attempts to preselect alternative sites and attract
ducks into those fields failed. Several reasons
existed which explain the low number of days of
utilization. First, some lure crop fields contained an insufficient food supply and a large
number of ducks rapidly consumed all available
grain. Second, numerous alternative feeding sites
were available. Third, vehicular or human harassment disrupted the waterfowl feeding pattern.
Fourth, fields purchased late in September could
be utilized by ducks for only a short time before
being released prior to the opening of waterfowl
hunting season. However, ducks could be held for
an entire 60-day damage season when allowed to
select their own feeding sites and feed undisturbed, given that a large enough lure crop was
purchased.

The number of complaints a lure crop field
prevented were estimated by two methods. First,
62 complaints produced the purchase of 60 lure
crops and two baited fields. The depredating
flocks associated with these lure crops produced
an additional 85 complaints before the fields
could be purchased. Therefore, a total of 147
complaints were actually resolved by lure crop
purchases. Secondly, 30 complaints could have
potentially been resolved by the purchase of each
lure crop field. This estimate is based on data
which indicated that in 77 percent of the reported complaints, ducks were allowed to feed in a
field for two days or less. These data are substantiated by the following field observations.
In the Mud Lake area during 1979, five complaints
were received concerning the same flock of birds
over a ten-day period. On the 11th day a lure
crop field was acquired and complaints ceased.
During 1978 in the Kulm area, approximately 80
complaints were received involving four flocks of
ducks in a 20-day period. In some cases, ducks
had only alighted in a field before.being frightened while in other cases ducks were in the field
one to two days (Duncan and Zahn, pers. comm.).

Ducks will often select another swathed field
as a feeding site after abandoning a lure crop.
This presented two management options. The first
was to purchase a replacement lure crop near the
original, which produced very limited results.
Ducks often required two to three days to select
another permanent feeding site and in the process
damaged numerous surrounding fields. The second
option involved hauling supplemental grain into
the original field. This method could not be
used in years when fall rains prevented vehicle
access to the field.
The percentages of standing, swathed and
harvested fields were determined within a threemile radius of all lure crops purchased from
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the optimum size of lure crops ranged from 18-42
acres. The number of days depredations were occurring before the purchase of a lure crop ranged
from 0-14. In 93 percent of the lure crops, depredations were occurring eight days or less before
purchase. Some of this delay was due to the logistics of completing the lure crop agreement.

1976-1980. These data revealed that lure crops
were purchased when harvest was 0-85 percent
complete. These data were based on small grain
only; row crops, such as sunflowers, were excluded. An examination of the relationship between harvest conditions and lure crop effectiveness indicated that all lure crops purchased
after the harvest was 50 percent complete could
not effectively hold ducks due to the abundance
of alternative feeding sites.

The following conditions produced optimum
results: (1) harvest operations in the surrounding
area were 20 percent or less done, (2) at least
2,500 birds were present in field at time of purchase, (3) an adjacent roost, (4) field size between 20-45 acres, and (5) a sufficient amount of
grain to hold birds but not an excess which would
result in grain spoilage.

The percentage of fall-plowed fields within a three-mile radius of all lure crops was
recorded. This revealed that in 88 percent of
the lure crops purchased, less than 25 percent
of the surrounding fields had been tilled. Fall
plowing is defined in this study to be any agricultural practice which results in all available
grain being removed. Harvested fields which were
tilled once were classified as "harvested fields"
because available grain remained, allowing these
fields to be used as alternative feeding sites.
Fall plowing conditions at the time of purchase
ranged from 0-30 percent completed and averaged
13 percent. In 1980, additional data collected
from 13 lure crops revealed the amount of fall
plowing averaged 10 percent at the time of purchase and 18 percent when lure crops were released. These data indicate that during the
damage season, only an additional 8 percent of
the surrounding fields were plowed. Data analysis revealed no statistical relationship between
fall plowing and lure crop effectiveness.

An extremely unusual situation developed in
1980 when an all-time record 30 inches of precipitation occurred during August and September, completely flooding most small grain fields in the
northeast quarter of the state. Under these conditions, thousands of highly preferred alternative
feeding sites became available and birds could not
reliably be attracted and held on a lure crop.
Furthermore, inundation results in grain quality
deterioration and prevents mechanical access to
the field for harvesting. Under these conditions
there was no potential for grain harvest and purchase of additional lure crops could not be
justified.
Comparative efficiency studies of lure crops
versus baited fields were attempted in 1979 and
1980. In 1979, two harvested small grain fields
were rented and baited. The first field successfully held 10,000 ducks for 12 days. The second
field was rented when the harvest was approximately 60 percent complete and resulted in limited
success because of an inability to hold ducks.
The 1980 study was aborted because fall rains prevented vehicle access to the prearranged field.
This example indicates that when wet conditions
restrict access, feeding stations would have limited value in preventing depredations.

Hills were a component of 55 percent of the
lure crops and 65 percent of the 172 surrounding
fields surveyed. Data analysis indicated lure
crops did not have a higher probability of having
a hill than any of the other surrounding fields.
These data imply that hills were not a factor
used by ducks when selecting a feeding site.
Grain consumption approached 100 percent in
34 percent of the lure crops. Statistically no
relationship existed between the percentage of
grain eaten and the effectiveness of a lure crop
field. For example, one completely consumed lure
crop was ineffective in preventing depredations
because the birds abandoned the lure crop and
damaged many of the surrounding swathed fields.
Conversely, in one lure crop only a small percentage of grain was consumed before the field
was released. However, that field was effective
in preventing any further depredations in the
surrounding area. Factors such as number of days
a lure crop was utilized, population size, yield,
size of field and alternative feeding sites determined the extent of grain consumption.

Mechanical scaring devices were not as effective
as lure crops during the early part of the damage
season. Most fields in the depredation area at
this time contained either standing or swathed
grain both of which are acceptable feeding sites
for ducks, but neither are acceptable to the
farmer. During the 1980 damage season, harvest
in the Devils Lake area was only 40 percent complete when waterfowl hunting season opened.
Therefore, during the entire damage season, in
this area, alternative feeding sites into which
ducks could be scared were practically nonexistent.

Population counts revealed 89 percent of
the lure crops contained 2,500 birds or more at
the time of purchase or shortly thereafter. In
the remaining 11 percent of the fields, population levels were below 500 when purchased and
never exceeded 2,500.

DISCUSSION
Analysis of field observations and data collected from the 62 lure crops revealed the following combination of factors produced successful
lure crops: (1) resolution of all complaints
within a 78.5 square-mile area, (2) lure crops of
a sufficient size (50-100 acres) prevented

Size of lure crops ranged from 6-75 acres
and averaged 30 acres. Based on bird use days,
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depredations throughout a 60-day damage season,
(3) lure crops which were capable of supporting
a minimum population of 2,500 birds were most
successful, (4) lure crops purchased early in
the damage season when the harvest was less than
50 percent complete were most successful, and
(5) with a benefit/cost ratio of 2:1 lure crops
proved cost effective.

This study indicated lure crops were uniquely
suited to North Dakota for the following reasons:
(1) lure crops were used only for ducks, geese,
and cranes, species which were easily frightened
and cause more damage by trampling than eating;
(2) only small grain which was especially susceptible to rampling was used for lure crops; (3) when
fall rains delayed harvest, acceptable alternative
feeding sites into which birds could be scared
were minimal; (4) the agricultural practice of
swathing compounded trampling; and (5) the latitude of North Dakota is such that a delayed small
grain harvest coincides with waterfowl migration.

Several problems were noted which reduced
lure crop effectiveness: (1) when fall rains
flooded fields or when the harvest reached 50
percent completion, numerous highly preferred
feeding sites were created and ducks could not
be reliably held in the lure crop; (2) in years
with an extended damage season, small lure crops
were quickly consumed allowing ducks to enter and
damage surrounding fields; (3) lure crops which
sustained a high percentage of damage at the time
of purchase, were not able to hold birds for the
duration of the damage season; (4) lure crops
preselected before damage occurred failed because
ducks could not reliably be forced into the field;
and (5) lure crops which had a small population
at the time of purchase did not exceed 2,500 birds
during the damage season and were not cost effective. The following factors were investigated
and subsequently shown to have no effect on lure
crop efficiency: the number of days of use,
grain consumption, presence of hills, and fall
plowing.

Field observations delineated circumstances
under which lure crop purchases should cease.
First, a lure crop should not be purchased when
weather conditions result in grain deterioration
and prevent harvest. Second, when the harvest
reaches 50 percent completion supplemental techniques become more effective. Third, lure crops
should not be purchased within two weeks of the
opening of waterfowl hunting season because creating large artificial concentrations of waterfowl
is not desirable at that time.
Baited fields and mechanical scaring devices
were ineffective in controlling waterfowl depredations early in the damage season for the following reasons: (1) fall rains prevented mechanical
access, (2) numerous alternative feeding sites
existed, and (3) preselection of waterfowl feeding
sites was ineffective.

Analysis of the factors contributing to a
successful lure crop resulted in establishment of
general and specific criteria. The general criteria for implementation of a lure crop project
in a state were: (1) the presence of a bird
species which can be scared from field to field
easily, quickly, and can be prevented from returning; (2) the ability to attract birds to a
lure crop and keep them from surrounding fields;
(3) a large concentration of birds must exist in
the depredation area; (4) crops must be vulnerable to depredations at the time bird concentrations build up; (5) the potential for a long
damage season should exist; and (6) damage must
be greater than that caused by eating.
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Specific criteria established for lure crop
purchase were: (1) a minimum of 2,500 ducks must
be present in the surrounding area; (2) during
a 30-day damage season, lure crops should be no
more than 50 acres in size but a 60-day damage
season may require the purchase of 100 acres;
(3) the number of alternative feeding sites must
be minimal; and (4) damage to the field at the
time of purchase must be minimal, thereby creating the potential to hold ducks for the duration
of the damage season.
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